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“Saper la mente della soa Beatitudine”: Pope Paul II and the 
ambassadorial community in Rome (1464–71)
Paul M. Dover
Kennesaw State University
Cet article examine la pratique des ambassadeurs envoyés par les états italiens à la 
cour du pape Paul II (1464–71), en se concentrant en particulier sur la façon dont ils 
ont assumé leur rôle d’informateur. Puisque Paul était un pape instable, impénétrable 
et souvent inaccessible, les ambassadeurs ont souvent été dans l’obligation d’obtenir des 
informations au sujet du pape et de ses intentions de manière indirecte. En s’appuyant 
largement sur la correspondance diplomatique romaine durant le pontificat de Paul, cet 
article montre comment les ambassadeurs se sont construit des réseaux de contacts au 
sein même de la cour papale afin de s’assurer un apport continu d’informations utiles et 
ce, en temps voulu. Ces réseaux comptaient donc des membres de toute la communauté 
évoluant autour de la papauté, incluant des cardinaux bien placés, des fonctionnaires 
ecclésiastiques, d’autres ambassadeurs, des agents politiques, aussi bien que plusieurs 
informateurs des hiérarchies inférieures. Rome était, en effet, un marché de l’information, 
si bien que les ambassadeurs devaient utiliser toutes leurs compétences pour entrer en 
possession des informations les meilleures et les plus précieuses.
Ambassadors at the papal court in the fifteenth century, charged with gauging and reporting the actions, mood, and intent of the pontiff, faced a host of 
challenges. Popes learned the game of deliberately limiting access to themselves, 
parrying inquiries and attention with a succession of complicit ecclesiastical of-
ficials or cardinals. They also variably and intentionally restricted and opened up 
access to consistorial meetings according to their own political whims. This meant 
that ambassadors keen on “knowing the mind of the pope” (saper la mente della 
soa beatitudine), as one ambassador put it, were forced to canvass other members 
of the papal court and the broader Roman community to acquire the information 
desired by their employers. This essay explores the particular tribulations that faced 
ambassadors in carrying out such tasks, focusing on the understudied pontificate 
of the Venetian Paul II (b. 1417, r. 1464–1471). It depicts the distinctive social and 
political topography of the papal court as a series of concentric spheres emanating 
from the pope at the centre, with a large number of individuals in various offices 
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at incremental levels of remove from the pope himself. The successive layers were 
inhabited by cardinals, curial officials, resident ambassadors, short-term envoys, 
and an innumerable body of ecclesiastics, Roman nobles, financiers, merchants, 
literati, servants, and hangers-on who served as conduits for information and 
indirect avenues for accessing the intentions of the pope. It should be stressed that 
these spheres were far from uniform, fluctuating in size, shape, and content, and 
the divisions between them permeable.1
The focus here on Paul II allows the examination of a number of difficult chal-
lenges for resident ambassadors. Paul was an inscrutable and notoriously prickly 
personality whose famously poor reputation in humanist circles was echoed in 
the observations of ambassadors and other statesmen. Quick to take offence, and 
obsessed with the prestige of both himself and the papacy, Paul passed unloved and 
unmourned. Here we address the question of what ambassadors were to do when 
faced with such a difficult pope.
A considerable body of scholarship has demonstrated that the gathering of 
information was the primary task of the resident embassies that gradually became 
the default form of diplomatic representation between the major Italian states in the 
second half of the fifteenth century.2 The Roman court by this time was the most 
important court in Europe, a centre for both diplomatic and ecclesiastical politick-
ing. Letters and visitors arrived from all over Europe and the Mediterranean and 
provided a panorama of the world outside of Rome. The ambassadors stationed there 
were expected, according to the instructions of the Duke of Milan to his envoys 
in Rome, to act with “ears strained and eyes peeled to ascertain everything … and 
inform us about it all.”3 Every individual sent to Rome as a resident ambassador 
during Paul’s pontificate sought to elicit a response similar to the one offered by 
the Duke of Modena, Borso d’Este, to his ambassador there in 1468, Jacopo Trotti: 
“You write of so many things that we can almost say that we are in Rome ourselves, 
so distinctly and neatly do you write about them … we commend you for your 
writing because you have given us so much context that we cannot believe it, for 
you describe them such that we touch them and hear them as if we were present.”4 
Jacopo Trotti was one (according to another observer) “from whom you hear the 
raw and the cooked (el cocto et el crudo) about happenings both inside and outside 
Italy.”5 Resident ambassadors stationed at Rome were thus expected to pursue the 
personal, knowing, as much as was possible, the mind of the pope; but also the 
global, providing a view of a far broader scene linked to Rome through multifarious 
connections.
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While keeping this second, global view in mind, this essay will focus on the 
first of these charges: knowing the mind of the Pope Paul II, and, if at all pos-
sible, influencing it. It should be emphasized that this was not simply a function 
of securing audiences with the pope, or observing and interacting with the pope 
in public meetings of the Consistory. It also meant calling upon other inhabitants 
of the social space of the Roman court, a space inhabited by a wide spectrum of 
influential and knowledgeable individuals other than the pope himself. This was 
especially imperative given the inaccessibility, unpredictability, and indecision of 
this particular pope. A good resident ambassador’s dispatch was an account of all 
that he had learned from his interactions not only with the pope, but with cardinals, 
ambassadors, and others.6 He was to engage in numerous daily conversations with 
dozens of individuals, and from those interactions know the mind of the pope and 
piece together a composite picture of events in Rome and beyond.
In 1438 the humanist Lapo da Castiglionchio, at that time in the household of 
Cardinal Condulmer, wrote a dialogue entitled On the Benefits of the Curia. The work, 
finished while Lapo was at the Council of Ferrara, depicts an imagined dialogue 
between the author and his friend Angelo da Recanate. Angelo urges Lapo to leave 
Rome as a locale unfit for a humanist, but Lapo feels compelled to convince his 
interlocutor otherwise. Lapo embarks on a systematic examination of the benefits 
of residing at the Curia, in so doing describing in detail many features of life there. 
At one point, he offers the following:
When Homer wanted to portray the prudent man in the person of Ulysses, he 
wrote as follows: “Having been cast onto various shores, he came to know the cities 
and customs of many peoples;” (Odyssey, I.3–4) that is, Homer denoted the same 
things [mentioned earlier] by the length of wandering and variety of places and 
men. I never thought that for the sake of pursuing this most precious thing [i.e. this 
virtue], anyone—like Ulysses—had to seek out Calyps, Circes, the Phaeacians, the 
Laestrygones, the Sirens, the Cyclops, and Hades. After all, what he gained by long 
wandering and with extreme danger to his life—well, the Roman Curia will offer 
you all of it in abundance. There, together, you would find a multitude of things, a 
variety of men, and a great number of inducements. For among Christians almost 
nothing of great importance is done on which the pope is not consulted or in which 
his authority is not in some way involved. Whether it is a deliberation concerning 
war, peace, or striking treatises, or marriages among the greatest kings and princes 
of the world, or even if it concerns some controversy that occurs among these great 
leaders, all things are deferred to the pope, and they are all discussed in the Curia as 
if it were a kind of public forum. This is why it is inevitable that whoever is involved 
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in such frequent contact with men and affairs sees many things, hears many things, 
learns many things, and also himself does many things. He takes advantage of the 
talk, conversation, and social interaction of many men—and these are men who are 
not common or unlearned—and he knows the customs and manners of living of 
many and forms acquaintanceships and friendships besides. From all these things, 
he is granted the power of approving and disapproving what he wishes, of choosing 
and rejecting, of letting go and taking back, as well as the power of correcting and 
emending. The result is that even if he is by nature somewhat dim-witted—and as 
long as he is not negligent—after being worn down and broken in for a while in the 
Curia, he often conquers men of the highest cleverness.7
Lapo’s depiction of the Roman Curia as a beehive of activity and as a locale that 
necessarily instructs its residents through their experiences there would have been 
familiar to fifteenth-century ambassadors stationed in Rome. They might not have 
shared Lapo’s high praise for those present at the papal court, nor his assessment 
of the Ulyssean benefits accorded by the Curia, but his depiction of a community 
where one “sees many things, hears many things, [and] learns many things” would 
have rung true to any resident ambassador in Rome. So too would have been Lapo’s 
placement of the pope at the centre of all these goings-on. For such resident ambas-
sadors, the pope himself was inevitably the hub of their own activities and attention, 
the focal point of political and ecclesiastical decision-making.
Getting access to this central figure was made more important by gradual 
changes in the office of the papacy and the Curia in the second half of the fifteenth 
century. Throughout the Middle Ages, the papacy and its actions had been governed 
by the individual who occupied it: his provenance and allegiances, his priorities, 
and perhaps most importantly, his personality. The fifteenth century, however, saw 
a transformation that Walter Ullman highlighted in his history of the medieval 
papacy: “it was the personalities of the popes which counted and set the tone … It 
was no longer the impersonal office with its powers that was determinative, but the 
personal character of the individual pope, his ‘humanity’—precisely the axiom which 
papal ideology from the mid-fifth century onwards had strenuously and successfully 
denied.” Ullman described it as a “reversal of pope and papacy.”8 This move toward the 
personal paralleled the increased focus of the popes on political matters rather than 
the spiritual and sacerdotal and, to a degree, on local rather than universal concerns. 
Popes increasingly functioned as temporal princes, expending considerable time and 
resources to reassert control over wayward papal vassals and vicariates and filling 
curial offices and the College of Cardinals mostly with politically well-connected 
Italians. The latter was an important part of the process by which the Curia was 
“Italianized,” a tendency that would only intensify in the sixteenth century.9
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The political culture of the Roman Curia had long been unique, unlike that 
of any other court in Italy, or anywhere else in Europe for that matter. At any given 
time, there was a highly complex mix of personnel present there, a combination 
of the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the Roman Church, ambassadors and envoys 
from all over Europe and beyond, and an incalculable number of hangers-on 
and miscellaneous individuals. The papal household alone numbered well into 
the hundreds.10 The court itself was a beehive of politicking, horse-trading, and 
advocacy. A recent treatment of papal Rome in the early modern period has called 
the city a “political laboratory.”11 “Rome was an open space, a meeting point for 
family ascents, a financial centre capable of mobilizing intense economic resources 
and a place of political decisions that interacted with the other centres of European 
politics.”12 Given the remarkable diversity of people, contacts, and comings and 
goings at the papal court in the fifteenth century, it should come as no surprise 
that the reports of ambassadors resident there are astonishingly rich documents, 
full of insights into the workings of the Church, the personalities of pontiffs and 
prominent churchmen, and a bewildering array of social and political practices. 
They are, without question, the best testimony we have to life in papal Rome in 
the Renaissance. One of the Duke of Milan’s ambassadors wrote in 1457: “at the 
court of Rome there are always envoys and ambassadors from the lords of the 
world, who evidently have nothing better to do than keep an eye on what papers 
are crossing the table.”13 What Maiolino Biasccioni, a Venetian historian-gazetteer 
and author of l’Albergo, said for Rome in the seventeenth century, applies equally 
to the Rome of Paul II: “Rome, as you know, is the place where all the news in the 
world is found.”14
Getting as close as possible to the fulcrum of decision-making, whether it be 
the prince or the most influential members of a republican oligarchy, was among the 
primary aims of the resident ambassador in the fifteenth century. It was here that a 
resident could best carry out his most important charge of gathering information. 
It was no different in Rome: Nicodemo Tranchedini, a long-serving ambassador of 
the Duke of Milan, remarked that an ambassador seeking answers was best off going 
to the pope himself, adding, “I do not know anywhere better to go for water than 
to the fountain.”15 Renaissance popes were frequently inscrutable or inaccessible 
for diplomats, but certain facets of Paul’s personality and mode of rule meant that 
water from this fountain was often unattainable or unreliable. This reality made 
ancillary sources of information more important. Ambassadors thus sought to draw 
upon a large range of contacts and sources amid the complex social topography of 
the Curia.
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Like all monarchical courts, the Curia revolved around the prince, with the 
pope at the centre. Jacques Heers has described the social situation of the papal 
court as an ensemble, with the members of the community unified by their depend-
ence on the pope.16 As one departed from the centre, the layers represented the 
increased distances of remove from, and influence on, the pontiff. The ambassador 
sought to inhabit, as much as possible, regions close to the centre, but there was 
a recognition that individuals closer to the periphery might nonetheless prove 
influential or useful.
Pietro Barbo was born in 1417, into one of the Venetian Republic’s patrician fam-
ilies. The Barbo were a small but influential and well-connected clan, which derived 
significant income from important ecclesiastical benefices. Initially, at least, the 
young Barbo was intended for a career in commerce. Instead, under the guidance 
of his uncle, Pope Eugenius IV (r. 1431–1447), he embarked on a career in the church. 
With the active support of Eugenius, he became archdeacon of Bologna and then 
bishop, sequentially, of Cervia and of Vicenza. He was elevated to cardinal-deacon 
of Santa Maria Nuova in 1440 at age 23. Under Pope Nicholas V (r. 1447–1455), he 
became the cardinal of San Marco. He observed four papal administrations, enjoy-
ing varying degrees of influence and generally looking out for the interests of his 
native Venice at the Curia. At the time of his own election as Pope in 1464, he had 
already been a cardinal for some 24 years.17
Paul II is perhaps the least studied of the post-Constance fifteenth-century 
popes, certainly in comparison to those between whom he was sandwiched: Pius II 
(r. 1458–1464), the most interesting man ever to be pope; and Sixtus IV (r. 1471–1484), 
patron of humanists and avid architect of the papal monarchy. Certainly Paul 
was widely disliked by contemporaries, as a man whose attitudes, ambitions, and 
personality traits made him unpopular in many circles. History’s view of Paul II 
as pope has been shaped in important ways by the many unkind words about him 
penned by the humanist historian Bartolomeo Sacchi (1421–1481), better known 
as Platina, who was a member of the Roman Academy accused of fomenting a 
conspiracy against the pope in 1468.18 He was arrested and cruelly tortured in the 
Castello Sant’Angelo, and Platina’s bitterness is evident throughout his account of 
Paul’s pontificate in his Lives of the Popes (completed in 1474 or 1475), written as a 
pièce de revanche. Platina paints a picture of a haughty, vindictive, and vainglorious 
pope who brooked absolutely no dissent. “I am pope, and I may do as I please,” he 
reports the pope declaring.19 Platina’s Paul was obsessed with luxury and ceremony 
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but penurious with his patronage. Platina resented the pope’s refusal to return the 
money that he had paid for an office that Paul had taken away from him on his ac-
cession to the papacy—an office Platina assumed would assure him a comfortable 
future.20 He was, according to Platina, morose and peevish, yet overly talkative 
and changeable. Most damningly for the humanist Platina, Paul was “a great enemy 
and despiser of human learning.”21 Other humanists echoed Platina’s assessment—
Francesco Filelfo (1398–1481), after Paul’s death, wrote to Pope Sixtus IV of Paul’s 
“incontinence, avarice and ambition.”22
Platina’s screed against the pope who had imprisoned, humiliated, and tortured 
him should not be taken at face value as a portrayal of this fifteenth-century pontiff. 
It is important to remember, as Vladimiro Zabughin has written, that “Platina depicts 
a frightful picture of hypocrites and hypocrisy. He wishes at all costs to depict a duel 
between himself and the pope as his personal enemy.”23 Considerable scholarship 
has suggested that Paul was not nearly the enemy of learning that Platina made him 
out to be, even if he did not patronize humanists to the extent both his predecessor 
and successor did.24 Despite these caveats, Paul II ended up as perhaps the most 
unpopular pope of the Renaissance period.
The roots of Paul’s unpopularity among ambassadors in Rome were actually 
considerably more prosaic than the hyperbole of Platina would suggest. Three factors 
above all others led to friction between the pope and the diplomatic community in 
Rome. First, Paul was obsessed with the reassertion of papal sovereignty over the 
many papal vassals and vicariates, and resisted sternly their attempts to align them-
selves with, or seek the protection of, the major Italian powers. As Paul’s priorities 
were primarily political and territorial, it was inevitable that he would butt heads 
with his Italian neighbors. The aspirations and actions of the Holy See were largely 
“Italianized” and his attempts to reassert papal temporal control, especially in the 
Romagna and Marches, were perceived as threatening by all other major Italian 
states, even, and perhaps especially, by Venice.
Second, Paul’s highly autocratic conception of the papal monarchy created ten-
sions. He marginalized the role of cardinals in decision-making, and clearly believed 
that his will should be followed without question, an attitude that perturbed many 
of his interlocutors. Neither of these tendencies was new or unique to Paul, of course, 
but their prominence during his papacy was distressing to many in Rome.
Third, it is clear that the personality and personal habits of this pope were 
the source of considerable consternation in the ambassadorial community. The 
dispatches of ambassadors of various Italian states resident in Rome during Paul’s 
pontificate indicate that not all of Platina’s invective was exaggeration. Many of the 
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unpleasant personality traits Platina emphasized were precisely those ambassadors 
in Rome repeatedly complained about. Let us now examine how these three factors 
impacted the ambassadorial community.
Throughout his pontificate, Paul was deeply concerned with the extension and 
consolidation of his temporal realm, where he sought to restore direct control over 
the territories of the papal state. As Ian Robertson has emphasized: “a fundamental 
premise of his temporal government seems to have been a conviction that every 
opportunity should be exploited to bring back all the territories of the Papal States 
under the direct government of the church.”25 According to the Milanese envoy 
Giovanni Bianchi, Paul’s goal was to “subject all the lands of the church that are not 
at the moment subjugated by him.”26 Paul expended a great deal of energy, starting 
early in his pontificate, in seeking to re-assert papal dominion over the important 
papal vicariate of Bologna, which jealously guarded its freedoms. The Cardinal of 
Spoleto, Bernardo Eruli, told Jacopo Trotti that it was common knowledge that 
the appetite of the pope “was to make himself lord of all of the Romagna.”27 The 
recapture of Rimini, when Sigismondo Malatesta’s illegitimate son Roberto seized 
the town despite an agreement that it would return to direct papal control upon his 
father’s death, became an obsession for Paul, so much so that he (in the words of the 
Duke of Milan), forgot his duties as a good pastor.28 Apart from a concerted effort, 
supported by papal troops, that led to the return of Cesena to direct papal control 
in 1465, Paul’s endeavours to reassert papal sovereignty over these territories were 
largely unsuccessful, to the great annoyance and frustration of this pope.29
The pope also sought to reassert his role as the feudal lord of the king of Naples. 
As a vassal of the papacy, the king depended on papal approval for his investiture as 
monarch. Ferrante had bought the support of the preceding pope Pius II expensively 
and Paul did not hesitate to call in his chips, expecting the king of Naples to dem-
onstrate obedience to the will of the papacy. In the event, Ferrante showed himself 
unwilling to restore vicariates such as Mondavio to papal control and also sought 
to loosen feudal ties between the pope and fiefs in the Regno such as Pontecorvo, 
the Duchy of Sora, and Terracina.30 Ferrante also actively opposed Paul’s efforts to 
return Roberto Malatesta and Rimini to papal obedience. Jacopo Trotti commented 
on how much Ferrante’s insubordination irked the pope: “I confess and believe 
that he [Ferrante] is not doing as many things as the Holy Father says he is, but I 
do say that the king has injured him to the heart and has shown him no respect at 
all, which is the greatest injury that one can inflict on a Lord as prideful, pompous 
and ambitious as is our pope.”31 In response to these slights, the pope engaged in 
the dangerous game of openly encouraging John of Anjou to pursue his claim on 
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the Kingdom of Naples—so much so that one ambassador labeled the pope “the 
first brother and friend of duke John.” The possibility of an Angevin intervention 
in Naples was a threat wielded by Paul throughout his papacy.
Paul’s ambitions for the extension of papal authority, in all its forms, were 
much remarked upon by ambassadors in Rome. The Milanese ambassador Giovanni 
Bianchi reported that “it is the opinion of many here, even of some cardinals, that 
every plan, act and care of the pope seeks and tends to make and keep him the judge 
of things in Italy and by consequence outside of Italy.” There was evidence, Giovanni 
suggested, that Paul sought to be the dominus dominantum.32 Another Milanese 
resident at the papal court, Agostino Rossi, seconded Giovanni’s assessment, saying 
that the pope wanted to be the one to whom all allegiance was directed; he wanted 
to impose laws on everyone, in both the spiritual and temporal realms.33 The pope, 
he said simply, “wants to be obeyed.”34
Such talk, it must be pointed out, was typical in the fifteenth century, when 
the papacy largely acted as just another player in the state system of the Italian 
peninsula—and thus the political and territorial ambitions of the papacy could be 
spoken of in the same fashion as were those of the king of Naples or the Republic 
of Venice. Paul was not the only pope accused of seeking to dominate Italian 
politics: the efforts of the Renaissance papacy to “fare grande la chiesa” led many 
to sympathize with the words attributed to Lorenzo de’ Medici: “to me it would be 
better to have three of four popes, instead of just one.”35 Still, there is no denying 
that the considerable emphasis placed by Paul on reasserting papal authority, in the 
temporal and spiritual realms, ruffled feathers.
This emphasis fed into Paul’s exalted view of the papal monarchy, which many 
felt shaded into autocracy. Paul’s rule reflected the general trend of the age, whereby 
“not only with regard to administration, but also—and even more—to politics and 
diplomacy, the later fifteenth century saw ecclesiastical government being increas-
ingly concentrated in the hands of a small palace committee, consisting of the pope 
and a few close advisers.”36 The reconstruction of papal monarchical authority, in 
which the College of Cardinals became largely vestigial to decision-making in Rome, 
inevitably led to tensions and clashes, between the pope and the cardinalate and 
between the pope and the Roman ambassadorial corps. Paul’s well-developed sense 
of his own importance was fully consonant with such changes; he was a jealous 
protector of papal power and privilege.
A rich, Venetian noble, about whom the chronicler Gaspare da Verona opined 
that he was the handsomest man to serve as pope,37 Paul displayed some of the 
haughtiness that was often attributed to Venetian patricians in the fifteenth century. 
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Platina’s picture of a pontiff in love with money and yet parsimonious in parcelling it 
out, while no doubt exaggerated, finds echoes in the dispatches of friendly and un-
friendly ambassadors alike. Pius, in his Commentaries, on several occasions remarked 
on Pietro Barbo’s love for worldly things as cardinal.38 The Venetian ambassador 
Bernardo Giustiniani, despite being the representative of an allied state, denounced 
the “intolerable pomp” of Paul II and sneered that “the pope spends all day counting 
and sorting his money and polishing pearls rather than on pater nosters.”39
Respect for the dignity of the Throne of St Peter was paramount for Paul, and 
observers did not hesitate to point out the dictatorial aspects of the pontiff’s rule.40 
Paul was deliberate in his attempts to extend the papal monarchy restored by Martin V. 
After Pius II’s issuing of the Execrabilis in 1460, the pontificate of Paul II was marked 
by pro-papal juridical theorizing, a process that accelerated even more under Paul’s 
successor, Sixtus IV.41 Again following the example of Pius, Paul rarely consulted 
the community of cardinals in decision-making and instead relied on a limited 
group of close advisers, which might include a small number of “cardinal prefects” 
who were part of the familia of the Apostolic Palace. Ambassadors also complained 
that the pope did not sufficiently take into account the preferences and desires of 
their princes when he was deciding how to fill offices and dispense benefices. These 
matters were of great importance to resident ambassadors in Rome, who lobbied the 
pope to consider candidates favourable to their employers. Agostino Rossi wrote 
on this matter that Paul never took into account the views of the emperor, king, or 
any princes and lords.42
Paul was also very attentive to the more symbolic elements of his power. He 
wore an extravagant tiara that was much talked about in Rome and commissioned 
a great many representations of himself on medals and coins. “Paul II was firmly 
persuaded that the pope ought to appear in a style befitting the highest position 
on earth.”43 Such was the self-regard of the pope, one resident of the Roman court 
noted, that “with this pope one must use honey rather than vinegar.”44
But just as nettlesome for ambassadors in Rome as these political and in-
stitutional factors were Paul’s personality and habits. There was much that was 
enigmatic about Paul’s character, and his personality vexed and frustrated ambas-
sadors, cardinals, and others who interacted with him at the papal court.45 These 
personal idiosyncrasies inevitably had political repercussions. One way in which the 
self-regard of the pope was reflected was his deliberately cultivated inaccessibility. 
A pope “who does not give audiences to living people,” a newly arrived ambassador 
remarked about Paul.46 Gaining audiences with the pope was a constant source of 
frustration for ambassadors, who prized such opportunities to press their concerns. 
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Paul held fewer consistories and granted fewer personal audiences than had been 
customary in Rome. “It has now become three times as difficult to have an audience 
as it was under Pope Pius,” an envoy from Breslau remarked.47 The complaints could 
be heard within a few weeks of his coronation as pope. The Mantuan ambassador 
Giovan Pietro Arrivabene remarked on Paul’s attitude towards audiences: “Already 
many have begun to complain about this pope, who is universally unpleasant 
and inhuman to everyone and, among other things, very difficult with audiences.” 
Arrivabene stressed that the cardinals were especially displeased with the pope’s 
expectation that they should come and go at the pope’s pleasure, describing him 
as arrogant and disdainful. The ambassador speculated that within a few months 
none of the cardinals would have any authority left.48
The strange hours that Paul kept as pope also occasioned complaint. He man-
aged to change the entire timeframe of the papal court. Paul was a night owl, rising 
late in the day, dining late, and conducting business well into the nighttime hours. 
Bleary-eyed ambassadors lamented such habits, and complaints were voiced that 
consistories and audiences occurred during the evening meal hours, leaving stomachs 
growling. A German ambassador once remarked that “His Holiness no longer gives 
audiences by day and as mine was the first, I sat in the pope’s chamber until 3 o’clock 
in the morning.”49 Ambassadors had to become accustomed to being summoned 
late into the night.50 Under Paul, consistories might begin well after sundown and 
go until the early morning.51 Such nocturnal habits garnered him the nickname 
cicindela, the glow worm; it was not meant kindly.52 Jacopo Trotti called the pontiff 
a man who turns night into day.53
Not only were audiences with the pope too infrequent for the liking of ambas-
sadors in Rome, but what they heard from the pope at such gatherings was rarely 
satisfactory. When the pope did grant audiences or hold consistories, the complaint 
was invariably that they went on too long, largely as a result of the pope himself 
talking. The Milanese ambassador Otto da Caretto, commenting less than two 
weeks into Paul’s pontificate, wrote that “the habit of His Holiness is to go on for 
a very long time in his speech and without much order, such that it is very difficult 
to report on his discussions in an orderly way.”54 Agostino Rossi in 1466 wrote of a 
four-hour interview with the pope composed of “varied, long and numerous discus-
sions about Italian matters.”55 Nicodemo Tranchedini called it the “usual way” for 
the pope to go an at length about a subject.56 A meeting with the ambassadors of 
the league of Florence, Milan, and Naples in 1467 went on for seven hours through 
the night, lasting so long that the next morning the Venetian ambassadors were 
convinced that some secret contract had been negotiated!57 Consistories were often 
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just as long and could be especially taxing for ambassadors during the heat of Roman 
summers. Jacopo d’Arezzo, an envoy of Marquis Ludovico Gonzaga, wrote that he 
had spent so long in the consistory in such stifling heat that he was in no shape to 
seek secret information.58 On more than one occasion Jacopo Trotti found himself 
kneeling at the feet of the pope, growing steadily more miserable, his knees aching 
as the pope launched into yet another lengthy pronouncement—he felt he would 
die a thousand times from the heat.59
The loquaciousness of the pope was wedded to a tendency to launch into hy-
perbole. Paul II might take a great deal of time to come to reach decisions, but the 
pope was unsparing with those who disagreed with his choices. Qui mecum non est, 
contra me est, is how Jacopo Trotti described the rule of Rome under this pope.60 
He took great umbrage at resistance to the absolute nature of papal authority. In 
August 1467, the pope declared that he would sooner “become Jew or Turk” than 
see the city of Forlì fall under Venetian protection.61
Ambassadors of Milan and Naples were often at the receiving end of the pope’s 
tongue-lashings, as their princes pursued policies that aroused Paul’s ire. In public 
and private, the pope vented his spleen against King Ferrante of Naples, whom he 
called “that thieving bastard king.”62 In October 1469, Paul attacked Ferrante in a 
barrage of resentment reported by the Milanese ambassador, Nicodemo Tranchedini. 
The pope not only declared that it was impossible to trust Ferrante on account of 
his malevolent nature, but he also claimed to know that King Alfonso was not really 
Ferrante’s father, and that Pope Calixtus had, some years ago, informed him of the 
real identity of the king’s parents.63 In September 1467, upset at the Duke of Milan’s 
intransigence over financial exactions from ecclesiastics in the Milanese, Paul raged 
against the Milanese and Neapolitan ambassadors. “I have never seen him so upset 
or disturbed,” Agostino Rossi observed.64 The next few months saw the Milanese 
ambassador regularly at the receiving end of diatribes from Paul—the ambassador’s 
dispatches read as if written by a man under siege. Paul claimed that Agostino had 
written “a thousand lies” in his dispatches to the Duke of Milan.65 This situation 
reached its nadir in November, when the pope threatened to lock Agostino up in 
the Castello Sant’Angelo.66
Things were no better for poor Lorenzo da Pesaro, who filled in as Milanese 
ambassador when Agostino was absent from Rome in 1468. Lorenzo faced the ful-
minations of the pope in response to Galeazzo Maria Sforza’s refusal to join a general 
peace without the participation of the king of France. The pope declared the Duke 
a traitor and called him crazy. Lorenzo hardly dared to write back to Galeazzo with 
this news and a fellow ambassador remarked that if he were in Lorenzo’s position 
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he would try not to be seen by anyone. “In truth, everyone feels compassion for this 
poor Messer Lorenzo,” Jacopo Trotti sympathetically observed.67 When faced with 
such episodes of spleen venting by the pope, ambassadors acted as filters, seeking 
to interpret the real meaning and intent of the pontiff’s words. “Do not get upset 
about anything that the pope says to me against you … for he says and does much 
worse to others,” Jacopo Trotti cautioned Borso d’Este.68
Ambassadors also wondered whether they could trust the pope’s words. Faced 
with a garrulous yet indecisive pontiff, ambassadors in Rome found it difficult 
to gauge the pope’s intentions. The pope rarely made decisions quickly, and he 
regularly changed his mind, or at least changed his declared intentions. “I do not 
know what he will do, because he does not take care of things quickly, and does 
not come readily to conclusions,” wrote Jacopo Trotti in 1467.69 Agostino Rossi 
echoed such an assessment a year earlier, when commenting on Paul’s attitude 
toward various states joining a general league: “it seems to be a beautiful game [of 
his] to stay indifferent and neutral like this, not showing himself to be here or there, 
only in order to be master of all and to be able to bash one against the other.”70 He 
echoed these sentiments just over a year later: “I do not know what to say except 
that I am amazed by the great variation and mutation of this pope: one moment he 
condemns the Venetians, the next he commends them; first he makes jokes about 
the demands of Bartolomeo Colleoni, and now he wants to satisfy them; he stresses 
that he wants to favor justice and your side, and now it appears to me he is more likely 
to do the opposite.”71 Agostino, in 1468, described himself as having to navigate a 
fluctuating sea, where the tide was constantly coming in and out. He made clear the 
source of this undulant water: “It is true, my Lord, that our Holy Father has strange 
and varied opinions.”72 Other ambassadors also remarked on how frustrating this 
changeability was. Jacopo Trotti ended one of his letters with an admonition to 
Borso d’Este: “As before, I tell you that one cannot put a great deal of trust in what 
the pope says at this moment, as there are twelve hours in a day.”73 There was noth-
ing that frustrated a resident ambassador more than such variability, as it made it 
difficult to report reliable information, and to conjecture about the likely course 
of events. Similar observations were made by Machiavelli when commenting on 
the Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian in 1509, a man, Machiavelli wrote, who “will 
often undo in the evening what he has done in the morning”:
This makes legations to him difficult, because the most important duty of the envoy, 
whether sent by a prince or a republic, is to conjecture the future through nego-
tiations and incidents. After all, the envoy who conjectures wisely and conveys 
his conjectures well to his government will assure his government the advantage, 
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allowing it to take measures at an appropriate time. When the envoy conjectures 
well, this honors the envoy and his government, but if he conjectures badly he and 
his government are dishonored.74
In the case of Paul II, such indecision and changeability not only discomfited am-
bassadors, it had political repercussions, as Walter Tommasoli recognizes in his 
assessment of Paul’s papacy: “[the pontificate] was listless and confused, which 
reflected the indecisive nature of a pope who was at the same time a centralizer of 
power.”75
For the purposes of the ambassadors, therefore, the words of the pope were 
overabundant and too likely to change according to audience and circumstance; his 
very credibility was questionable. The nature of the fifteenth-century court was such 
that there was always suspicion that a prince was deliberately speaking in a manner 
that was incomplete, misleading, or downright false; it was one of the tasks of the 
resident ambassadors to gauge and assess the veracity of such words. Ambassadors 
emphasized very regularly the disingenuous mode of speech and suspicious nature 
of this pope. The Archbishop of Milan, Stefano Nardini, said of him shortly after 
Paul’s election: “in truth this pope is of a very suspicious nature and while he makes 
easy use of generous words towards you [Duke Francesco Sforza of Milan], I do not 
yet know how well one can trust him.”76 “I have begun to take this opinion of His 
Holiness,” Otto da Caretto wrote nearly two months after Paul’s election, “that he 
has quite a skill of providing beautiful words that are without effect.”77 Lorenzo da 
Pesaro, also writing to the Duke of Milan, echoed these words: “It is certain that 
His Holiness speaks very well, but his words differ from the facts.”78 It would be 
hard to conjure up a more delicate means of saying that the pope lied.
Resident ambassadors in Renaissance Rome spent a good deal of their time 
pressing the flesh with cardinals, especially given the hurdles placed before them 
by Pope Paul II. In fifteenth-century Italy, this group of men was an increasingly 
politicized group that represented a cross-section of Italian politics. Cardinals were 
officers of the Roman church but also semi-official representatives of their home 
states. Some became cardinal-protectors, a term used loosely and infrequently 
throughout the fifteenth century, where they were closely associated with the in-
terests of their home state.79 Some served essentially as resident ambassadors in 
their own right. An example of such a figure was Cardinal Francesco Gonzaga, the 
son of Marquis Ludovico Gonzaga of Mantua. Elevated to the cardinalate by Pius 
II, Francesco was ambivalent about what he could expect from Paul II, observing 
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that the pope did not have a “good stomach for the Gonzaga.”80 Although assisted 
by a series of envoys sent to Rome, Cardinal Gonzaga acted as the de facto Mantuan 
ambassador. Similarly, the French cardinals present in Rome—Jean Jouffroy, Jean 
Balue, Alain de Coëtivy, and especially Guillaume d’Estouteville—fulfilled many 
of the roles of resident ambassador for the king of France, and were actively sought 
out by other ambassadors for news from France and the perspective of the French 
king. This was especially the case because the king of France did not regularly keep 
an ambassador resident in Rome.
Rivalries within the cardinalate mirrored those of the larger Italian political 
scene, as cardinals jostled for position within the church, but also for political 
and ecclesiastical advantage for their own lords. The advent of a new pope might 
radically overturn the political position of a cardinal, turning favour into disfa-
vour. Many of the cardinals who had been closest to Pius II, known as the Pieschi, 
found themselves sidelined by Paul—most notable here were Niccolò Fortiguerra 
(often called Teano in dispatches), Bartolomeo Roverella (usually called Ravenna), 
Bernardo Eroli (Spoleto, or Spoletano), Francesco Gonzaga (Mantua), and Jacopo 
Ammannati-Piccolomini (Pavia). While the first four of these ultimately established 
tolerable relationships with the pope, Ammanati would remain one of the new pope’s 
most consistent and ardent critics.81 He regularly offered aid and ideas to friendly 
ambassadors, in particular those of Milan and Florence.82
At the beginning of Paul’s pontificate, many ambassadors expressed fears that 
this Venetian pope would populate the ranks of the curial offices with Venetians; 
Agostino Rossi feared that the new pope would become the “chaplain” of Venice,83 
while on occasion the court would ring with warnings that the Venetians were 
“becoming popes.”84 In fact, while a number of Venetians assumed prominent roles, 
they did not dominate the papal court. Nor did the administration of Paul II prove 
particularly favourable toward the interests of the Venetian government. Paul did 
end up elevating three Venetian relatives (Marco Barbo, Giovanni Battista Zeno, 
and Giovanni Michiel) to the cardinalate, but there was no Venetian takeover, as 
many had dreaded. In fact, instances of tension and disagreement with Venice 
proved to be far more common under Paul than was concord; Venetian ambassa-
dors at the Curia were often deeply unhappy and among those most critical of the 
pope.85 The acrimony was particularly acute with the advent of the Rimini crisis, 
in which papal expectations of political and military support from Venice against 
Roberto Malatesta went unfulfilled. The Venetians proved totally uninterested in 
contributing to an effort to consolidate papal control over a territory on Venice’s 
front doorstep, especially at a time when they were under intense pressure from the 
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Turks in the eastern Mediterranean. The Florentine ambassador Otto Niccolini’s 
description of the relationship between the pope and Venice in April 1470 applied 
to the rest of Paul’s pontificate: “in secret, there is little love, in fact there is quite 
a bit of rancor.”86
It is evident that under Paul II the number of cardinals whom the pope could 
count as friends was small. Unsurprisingly, one of this group was his own nephew, 
Marco Barbo, who was made the cardinal of San Marco in 1467. Marco had been 
Bishop of Vicenza and master of Paul’s household when Paul was still a cardinal. 
Jacopo Trotti described him as “the right eye of the pope” just after he became 
cardinal.87 Once cardinal, Marco Barbo’s profile in Rome was further enhanced. 
Gaspare of Verona, who wrote a largely laudatory account of Paul’s papacy, wrote 
of the cardinal’s role alongside the pope: “Paul II is very well pleased to have added 
him to the number of cardinals and to have confided difficult tasks to him, and 
he constantly gives him more responsibilities of such a kind. He is certainly very 
well endowed for important affairs … loyal and devoted to the supreme pontiff 
Paul II.”88
The relationship between the pope and a large portion of the College of 
Cardinals was strained from the very beginning of Paul’s reign. The pope wasted 
no time in rejecting the capitulations which the College of Cardinals had agreed 
upon prior to electing him—these included arrangements for a church council 
within three years, the fixing of the size of the College at 24 cardinals, and plan-
ning for war against the Turks.89 He had legal documents drawn up to show that 
these stipulations did not apply to him as pope, forcing several reluctant cardinals 
to consent to the revisions. He predictably rebuffed any calls for a church council, 
recognizing in them the inherent threat to his authority. He also suspended the 
financial arrangements for the Crusade, so beloved of Pius II. The mutual suspicion 
that resulted did not fully dissipate in the years that followed: cardinals resented 
Paul’s exalted conception of papal monarchical rule, and his desire to reassert 
papal control over papal vassals and vicariates often threatened the interests of 
their native states.
In practice, the social and political circles that built up around individual 
cardinals meant that Rome was a city of many courts, not just one centred on the 
pope. Giorgio Chittolini has stressed that we should think of the Roman court in 
the broadest terms, encompassing the papal court, the Curia, and the households 
of the cardinals.90 Some of the more prominent cardinals operated what amounted 
to chanceries of their own, with dozens of letters coming in and going out every 
day. Some of these letters might contain information of considerable interest to 
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ambassadors resident in Rome, and their dispatches are full of references to letters 
shown to them by individual cardinals or their secretaries.
One of the chief tasks of any resident ambassador in Rome was to establish a 
reliable network of cardinal “friends,” who would provide information from con-
sistories or other curial meetings to which access was limited; lobby and provide 
access to influential personnel at the Roman court; and even advocate sympathetic 
positions to the pope on the ambassador’s behalf. The references in ambassadorial 
dispatches to cardinali amici, cardinali nostri, and cardinali partesani are legion.
The Este of Ferrara, for example, did not have a cardinal in Rome during the 
pontificate of Paul II, and thus their ambassadors sought to establish useful relation-
ships with cardinals resident in Rome for their influence, connections, and access 
to information. Cardinals at Rome were referred to by a range of monikers by the 
Estense ambassador Jacopo Trotti. Il Greco, or Niceno, was Cardinal Bessarion 
Trapezentius, Rohanno was the French cardinal Guillaume d’Estouteville, Sancto 
Angelo was Juan Carvajal, and San Marco was Marco Barbo. These connections 
became valuable not only because they might provide insight into the delibera-
tions inside the meetings of the Consistory and the viewpoints of the pope, but 
also because they supplied news from a range of locales. Estouteville filled in the 
ambassador on the latest information from France (providing the Estense ambas-
sador with the “very freshest letters from France”91); Barbo discussed the latest 
debates inside the Venetian Senate; Bessarion updated him with harrowing news 
of the threat offered by the Turks in the East. Jacopo regarded certain cardinals as 
particularly well disposed to the interests of Ferrara, most notably Juan Carvajal, 
whom he referred to as nostro homo qui.92 Carvajal, unfortunately for Jacopo, had 
a poor relationship with the pope.
Milanese ambassadors in Rome, as we have seen, often found themselves at 
odds with the pope, given the frequently contentious relationship between the Duke 
Galeazzo Maria Sforza and Paul II. Because the pontiff kept these ambassadors at 
arm’s length, they were forced to rely on friendly cardinals for information and access, 
usually Guillaume d’Estouteville (whom Antonio da Bracello referred to as nostro 
compare93), Francesco Gonzaga, Angelo Capranica, and Jacopo Ammannati.94 
These men were Pieschi and Paul II systematically sought to exclude them, Gonzaga 
aside, from positions of influence in the Curia; there was considerable tension 
between these men and the Pauleschi, the cardinals appointed by Paul himself.95 
When Jean Balue, the Bishop of Angers, was elevated to the cardinalate by Paul II in 
September 1467, Agostino Rossi wrote hopefully that he would prove a great asset 
to the Milanese cause in the College of Cardinals.96
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Other than the cardinals, of course, there were a large number of other 
ecclesiastics. The papal court was teeming with bishops, archbishops, notaries, 
papal secretaries, and chancery officials—members of a vast service bureaucracy 
hovering around the Holy See. In one regard, such officials could be more valuable 
than cardinals as sources of information and influence, as they were not of such 
high-profile and they could be consulted with more discretion. At the beginning of 
every pontificate, resident ambassadors took stock of those appointed to prominent 
and influential positions by the pope. There was a scurry to identify those who were 
likely to look favourably upon the interests of the state or prince that the ambassador 
was representing. We can see this in the dispatch of Otto da Caretto, the Milanese 
representative in Rome at the outset of Paul’s reign, to Duke Francesco Sforza, in 
which he listed dozens of appointees to curial offices, administrative positions (such 
as castellans and podestà) in the papal states, and condottieri hired—a detailed 
plan of the papacy’s new administrative staff.97
Among the most important of such officials in Paul’s Rome was Leonardo 
di Piero Dati, a Florentine canon and Bishop of Massa who became the preferred 
secretary of the pope. As early as a month after Paul’s election, ambassadors were 
noting his favoured position alongside the pope.98 As a Florentine, he often offered 
his services to Florentine ambassadors, although Lorenzo de’ Medici mistrusted 
him intensely, calling him “a mortal enemy of the house of Medici.”99
Similarly, the Milanese ambassadors drew repeatedly on the service of the 
archbishop of Milan, Stefano Nardini, a well-connected churchman who enjoyed the 
favour of Paul II. Nardini, “ha buon loco” alongside the pope, according to Otto da 
Caretto.100 Nardini regularly wrote letters to the Duke of Milan that complemented 
those of the Milanese ambassadors. In November 1466, Agostino Rossi was under 
considerable pressure from Duke Galeazzo Maria Sforza, not known for his patience, 
to secure the open bishopric of Albenga for the duke’s favored candidate. The pope, 
however, insisted on awarding it to the Bishop of Savona, who had served the pontiff for 
some 30 years, but who was a member of the Fregoso family, traditionally hostile to the 
Sforza. In several audiences with the pope, Agostino reminded the pope of promises to 
satisfy Milanese concerns, but the pope was unreceptive. Faced with such indisposition, 
Agostino took his case to the prelati di casa (his description of those close to the pope), 
which included Stefano Nardini, Marco Barbo (at that time, the Bishop of Vicenza 
and not yet cardinal), and the Bishop of Tirasona. He then tried his luck with several 
cardinals: Teano (Niccolò Fortiguerra), Pavia (Jacopo Ammannati-Piccolomini), and 
Mantua (Francesco Gonzaga). All reiterated that it would be impossible to budge the 
pope from his position, as it indeed proved to be.101
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The presence of envoys from all over Italy and Europe made Rome a window 
on the wider world. Ambassadors in Rome, when they were not in audiences or 
seeking information from cardinals and other curial officials, could often be found 
interacting with one another. Waiting and biding time took up a large portion 
of the day of resident ambassadors anywhere in fifteenth-century Italy—indeed, 
boredom was one of the occupational hazards of the resident ambassador. But in 
Paul II’s Rome, as we have seen, this took on an altogether new dimension; the 
waiting could be endless. Ambassadors regularly agonized over waiting hours for 
audiences that often never materialized. But ambassadors also sought to make use 
of such periods of waiting, interacting with each other in their constant search for 
information. Here they would press the flesh, share gossip, and exchange letters in 
the hope of ascertaining useful information they could then pass on in their letters 
home. There were always large numbers of people waiting around in the hopes 
of seeing the pope or securing papal favour or funding. To provide but a single 
example, Agostino Rossi and Lorenzo da Pesaro in January 1467 wrote of their 
conversations on one day with Hungarian ambassadors hoping to secure a subsidy 
for their struggle against the Ottomans; with the Grand Master of the Knights of 
St John seeking relief from the order’s debt; with the Albanian captain Scanderbeg 
seeking military assistance; and with condottieri hoping for new contracts—all 
while waiting for an audience with the pope.102
Ambassadors also visited each other’s residences, where they might better 
exchange letters or converse in private. Jacopo Trotti regularly visited the Venetian 
house in Rome, where he learned of letters coming from Venice and beyond.103 
Ambassadors’ residences were clustered in the heart of the city, thus providing 
meeting places outside the more official milieus like the papal palaces. In February 
1468, the ambassadors of Milan, Florence, and Naples all gathered at the Rome 
residence of the Neapolitan ambassador, Garcia Betes, to read letters freshly arrived 
from Florence and hear news from Naples, including a letter directed to the College 
of Cardinals by Ferrante.104
The ambassadors of allied or friendly states were most likely to work together 
or share information. In some cases, allied ambassadors would pen joint dispatches, 
as, for example, did the ambassadors of the alliance between Florence, Milan, and 
Naples. These letters would be signed oratori della lega, referring to the lega particolare 
between these three states, and would supplement the letters of individual ambas-
sadors in a sign of solidarity.105 Instructions to Milanese ambassadors sometimes 
directed them to work as much as possible in unison with the envoys of their coali-
tion partners, in order to present a unified front to the pope.106 These ambassadors 
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also regularly presented themselves as a group to the pope for audiences, or sought 
out the pope or his closest cardinals to present a joint proposal from the members 
of the league. Similarly, during the papacy of Paul II, the ambassadors of Ferrara 
habitually worked in tandem with their counterparts from Venice.
Ambassadors also made reference to a host of connections at the papal court 
that remained unnamed—sources that provided ambassadors with information 
but which, usually deliberately, were left without precise identification. Resident 
ambassadors from all states referred cryptically to their sources in Rome. On oc-
casion they might be identified by provenance, such as venetiano or genovosino107 or 
by their status, such as ecclesiastico, courtiere or soldato. More frequently the labels 
preserved an even more obscure anonymity. There were amici, uomini buoni e de 
bone fide, persona de autorità108, persona digna109, uno amico mio110, uno notabile 
homo111 with whom they established relationships at the Roman court. These vague 
appellations left the flesh and blood individuals in the shadows. It is quite possible 
that some of these individuals were paid informants, although evidence of such ar-
rangements almost never appears in the dispatches. Giovanni Bianchi was typical 
among ambassadors when he regularly learned about what happened in secret 
papal consistories from an unnamed cardinal—he would only describe him in his 
dispatches as un reverendissimo cardenale partesano de la Vostra Excellentia.112 But 
the language might even be more discreet than a reference to a particular individual. 
As at other courts, ambassadors in Rome wrote of receiving information da buon 
luogo113 or per bona via114, phrases that periphrastically could describe nearly anyone 
or anywhere. Such unnamed sources and connections were an important tool in 
gathering information and gaining insight into the intentions of the pope. Perhaps it 
was Nicodemo Tranchedini who put it most succinctly when he informed the Duke 
of Milan that he expected Paul, in 1471, to name new cardinals, as he had talked to 
someone who “knew quite a lot about the mind of the pope.”115
This examination of the experiences of resident ambassadors in Rome under 
Pope Paul II testifies to important features both of diplomatic representation and 
of the make-up of the papal court in the second half of the fifteenth century. Resi-
dent ambassadors at the Curia, as was the case for ambassadors stationed in Milan, 
Venice, and other courts that saw heavy traffic of visitors and news from abroad, 
were valued largely for their capacity to gather and report information. In Rome, 
of course, residents were also tasked with the complicated and time-consuming 
business of politicking with the pope, and those who might influence the pope, over 
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ecclesiastical appointments. In pursuing both tasks, direct or indirect access to the 
pope was paramount—hence the great importance placed on cultivating a range of 
sources and connections that spanned the population of the Curia.
In Rome there was a broad and varied market for the commodity of information. 
As in a commodity market, there were grades of product, which were more or less 
difficult to extract. Like market-savvy entrepreneurs, competent resident ambas-
sadors sought to use every resource at their disposal to secure good product. The 
complex nature of the papal court, with its unique polyvalent structure, mixture of 
personnel and nationalities and dual secular and ecclesiastical identities, provided 
any number of avenues for such information gathering. The most important informa-
tion concerned the outlook and intentions of the pope, of course, and ambassadors 
were rarely able to avail themselves directly of the pope’s outlook. Often they were 
furnished only with fragmentary or carefully filtered information from the pope 
and his immediate circle. Given the challenges thrown up by Paul II, resident am-
bassadors were forced to be flexible, creative, and dogged in their efforts to know 
the mind of the pope.
The travails of ambassadors resident in Paul II’s Rome also tell us much about 
the increasingly mundane and local preoccupations of the fifteenth-century papacy. 
Paul II, in a fashion characteristic of Renaissance popes, expended a very large 
portion of his time and efforts on secular and local, territorial concerns. While the 
regular flow of visitors from across western Christendom provided reminders of 
the universal claims and responsibilities of papal authority, the scope of Paul II’s 
vision was on a day-to-day basis considerably more confined. In regards to affairs in 
France, for example, Paul as pope spent a disproportionate amount of time cultivat-
ing the political ambitions of John of Anjou toward the Kingdom of Naples. In this 
fashion, the papal court, despite its unique profile and dimensions (which shaped 
ambassadors’ tasks in important ways), came to resemble closely princely courts 
elsewhere in Italy. In many areas, Paul II acted in a manner scarcely distinguish-
able from the Duke of Milan or King of Naples. Even the factional divisions in the 
cardinalate mirrored the rivalries present among court nobilities at other Italian 
courts. And while ambassadors did expend many hours on ecclesiastical affairs at 
the papal court, recommending candidates for curial offices and vacant benefices, 
their tasks in Rome resembled closely those of ambassadors who served at other 
Italian courts: carrying out political negotiations, monitoring relations with the 
prince, and, above all, collecting information. It is therefore not surprising that 
many of the ambassadors who served as resident ambassadors in Rome also served 
as ambassadors at other times at other courts; the skills required were very much 
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the same. It is also telling that very few of the ambassadors assigned to the Curia 
were churchmen; their concern for the affairs of the church was clearly secondary 
to their tasks in Rome.116
In the politicized papal monarchy of the second half of the fifteenth century, 
where the character and ambitions of the individual who served as pontiff eclipsed 
the interests of the institution, it was inevitable that the personal would become 
political. We have seen that the pretensions and personality of Pope Paul II pre-
sented considerable challenges to ambassadors resident at the papal court, forcing 
them to employ manifold means and avenues to “know the mind of the pope.” It 
was an experience that produced a great deal of infelicity among this fellowship of 
diplomats, and produced in their dispatches shockingly candid barbs directed at 
the pope. It is likely that many of these ambassadors would have agreed with the 
sentiments expressed by Giovanni Bentivoglio (1443–1508), the lord of the com-
mune in Bologna and one who had numerous run-ins with the late pope, in a letter 
to Lorenzo de’ Medici, shortly after Giovanni learned of Paul’s death: “I pray to 
God that He might give us a better pope.”117
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